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"Is Catholicism compatible with American democracy?"
Such a question inverts the order of values says Father Murray.

He asks is American democracy compatible with Catholicism. No
other manner of putting the question would be acceptable to anyone
who places . . . conscience . . . above . . . human law and sentiment.

THE PROBLEM OF PLURALISM
IN AMERICA*
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J.t

THE

FOUNDATION

OF

AMERICAN

UNITY

PLURIBUS UNUM" is more than a motto. It is a fact. Protestant,

L

Catholic, Jew, pagan, agnostic and atheist have learned by the
lessons of our singular national history and the genius of our constitutional system to build social and political unity amid a discord of
religious creeds.
While a full analysis of the American solution to this age-old problem
cannot be attempted here, the following propositions seem basic and
undeniable.
1. "There are truths and we hold them."

The life of man in society under government is founded on truth, on
certain objective truths, universal in their import, accessible to man,
definable, defensible. "We hold these truths to be self evident." If this
assertion be denied, the American tradition of government is eviscerated
at one stroke. It is indeed in many respects a pragmatic proposition; but
as a whole it does not rest on the philosophy of pragmatism. For the
pragmatist there are properly speaking no truths, only results. But the
American proposition rests on the more traditional conviction that
truths are, and that they can be known.
2. "We recognize the sovereignty of God over nalions as well as
over individual mien."

This is the principle that radically distinguishes the conservative
Christian tradition of America from the Jacobin laicist tradition of
*Digested and reprinted, with permission, from 29 Thought 165 (June 1954).
tM.A., Boston College; S.T.L., Woodstock College; S.T.D., Gregorian University
(Rome). Professor of Theology, Woodstock College; Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Yale University (1951-52); Editor. Theological Studies.

THE CATHOLIC

Continental Europe. The Jacobin tradition
proclaimed the autonomous reason of man
to be the first and the sole principle of
political organization. In contrast, the first
article of the American political faith is
that the political community, as a form of
free and ordered human life, looks to the
sovereignty of God as to the first principle
of its organization. The United States has
had, and still has, its share of agnostics and
unbelievers. But it has never known organized militant atheism on the Jacobin, doctrinaire Socialist, or Communist model; it
has rejected parties and theories which
erect atheism into a political principle. In
1799, the year of the Napoleonic coup
d'gtat which overthrew the Directory and
established a dictatorship in France, President John Adams stated the first of all
American first principles in his remarkable
proclamation of March 6:
. . . it is also most reasonable in itself that
men who are capable of social acts and relations, who owe their improvements to the
social state, and who derive their enjoyments
from it, should, as a society, make acknowledgements of dependence and obligation to
Him who hath endowed them with these
capacities and elevated them in the scale of
existence by these distinctions. ...

President Lincoln on May 30, 1863, echoed
the tradition in another proclamation:

Whereas the Senate of the United States,
devoutly recognizing the supreme authority
and just government of Almighty God in all
the affairs of men and nations, has by a reso-

lution requested the President to designate
set apart a day for national prayer and
humiliation; And whereas it is the duty of
nations as well as of men to own their dependence upon the overruling power of
God, to confess their sins and trespasses in
humble sorrow, yet with the assured hope
that genuine repentance will lead to mercy
and pardon ....

LAWYER

The authentic voice of America speaks in
these words. And it is a testimony to the
enduring vitality of this first principle the sovereignty of God over society as well
as over individual men - that President
Eisenhower in June, 1952, quoted these
words of Lincoln in a proclamation of
similar intent. There is, of course, dissent
from this principle, uttered by American
secularism (which, at that, is a force far
different in content and purpose from Continental laicism). But the secularist dissent
is clearly a dissent; it illustrates the existence of the American affirmation. And it
is continually challenged. For instance, as
late as 1952 an opinion of the United States
Supreme Court challenged it by asserting:
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Three
times before in its history - in 1815, 1892,
and 1931-the Court has formally espoused
this same principle.
The affirmation in Lincoln's famous
phrase, "this nation under God," sets the
American proposition in fundamental continuity with the central political tradition of
the West. But this continuity is more
broadly and importantly visible in another,
and related, respect. In 1884 the Third
Plenary Council of Baltimore made this
statement: "We consider the establishment
of our country's independence, the shaping
of its liberties and laws, as a work of special
Providence, its framers 'building better than
they knew,' the Almighty's hand guiding
them." The providential aspect of the matter, and the reason for the better building,
can be found in the fact that the American
political community was organized in an
era when the tradition of natural law and
natural rights was still vigorous. Claiming
no sanction other than its appeal to free
minds, it still commanded universal accep-
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tance. And it furnished the basic materials
for the American consensus.
The American Republic was conceived
in the tradition of the natural law.
3. "There is a law above kings and parliaments, above presidents and legislators."
To the early Americans government was
not a phenomenon of force, as the later
legal positivists would have it. Nor was it
a "historical category," as Marx and his
followers were to assert. Government did
not mean simply the power to coerce,
though this power was taken as integral to
government. Government, properly speaking, was the right to command. It was
authority. And its authority derived from
law. By the same token its authority was
limited by law. In his own way Tom Paine
put the matter when he said, "In America
Law is the King." But the matter had been
better put by Henry of Bracton (d. 1268)
when he said, "The king ought not to be
under a man, but under God and under
the law; because the law makes the king."
This was the message of Magna Charta;
this became the first structural rib of American constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism, the rule of law, the
notion of sovereignty as purely political and
therefore limited by law, the concept of
government as an empire of laws and not
of men - these were ancient ideas, deeply
implanted in the British tradition at its
origin in medieval times. The major American contribution to the tradition - a contribution that imposed itself on all subsequent
political history in the Western world was the written constitution. However, the
American document was not the constitution octroyge of the nineteenth century
Restorations - a constitution graciously

granted by the King or Prince-President.
Through the American techniques of the
constitutional convention and of popular
ratification, the American Constitution is
explicitly the act of the people. It embodies
their consensus as to the purposes of government, its structure, the extent of its
powers and the limitations on them, etc.
By the Constitution the people define the
areas where authority is legitimate and the
areas where liberty is lawful. The Constitution is therefore at once a charter of freedom and a plan for political order.
4. "Governments are instituted by men
to secure the unalienable rights with
which they have been endowed by their
Creator. But governments derive their
just powers from the consent of the
governed."
The American plan of government includes a great act of faith in the capacity
of the people to govern themselves. The
faith of our Founding Fathers was not unrealistic. It was not supposed that everybody could master the technical aspects
of government, even in a day when these
aspects were far less complex than they
now are. The supposition was that the
people could understand the general objectives of governmental policy, the broad
issues put to the decision of government,
especially as these issues raised moral
problems. The American consensus accepted the premise of medieval society, that
there is a sense of justice inherent in the
people, in virtue of which they are empowered, as the medieval phrase had it, to
"judge, direct, and correct" the processes
of government.
It was this political faith that compelled
early American agreement to the institutions of a free speech and a free press. In
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the American concept of them, these institutions do not rest on the thin theory proper
to eighteenth-century individualistic rationalism, that a man has a right to say what
he thinks merely because he thinks it. The
American agreement was to reject political
censorship of opinion as unrightful, because
unwise, imprudent, not to say impossible.
However, the proper premise of these freedoms lay in the fact that they were social
necessities. "Colonial thinking about each
of these rights had a strong social rather
than individualistic bias," Rossiter says.
They were regarded as conditions essential
to the conduct of free, representative, and
responsible government. People who are
called upon to obey have the right first to
be heard. People who are to bear burdens
and make sacrifices have the right first to
pronounce on the purposes which their
sacrifices serve. People who are summoned
to contribute to the common good have the
right first to pass their own judgment on
the question, whether the good proposed
be truly a good, the people's good, the
common good. Through the technique of
majority opinion this popular judgment
becomes binding on government.
5. "The state is distinct from society and
limited in its offices to society."
Before it was cancelled out by the rise
of the modern omnicompetent society-state,
this principle had found expression in the
distinction between the order of politics and
the order of culture, or, in the language of
the time, the distinction between studium
and imperium. The whole order of ideas
in general was autonomous in the face of
government; it was immune from political
discipline, which could only fall upon actions, not ideas. Even the medieval Inquisition respected this distinction of orders;
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it never recognized a crime of opinion,
crimen opinionis," its competence extended
only to the repression of organized conspiracy against public order and the common good. It was, if you will, a Committee
on un-Christian Activities; it regarded activities, not ideas, as justiciable.
The American proposition, in reviving
the distinction between society and state,
which had perished under the advance of
absolutism, likewise renewed the principle
of the incompetence of government in the
field of opinion. Government submits itself
to judgment by the truth of society; it is
not itself a judge of the truth in society.
Freedom of the means of communication
whereby ideas are circulated and criticized,
and the freedom of the academy (understanding by the term the range of institutions organized for the pursuit of truth and
the perpetuation of the intellectual heritage
of society) are immune from legal inhibition
or government control. This immunity is
a civil right of the first order, essential to
the American concept of a free people
under a limited government.
6. "Only a virtuous people can be free."
"A free people" has a special sense in
the American tradition of government.
America has passionately pursued the ideal
of freedom, expressed in a whole system
of political and civil rights, to new lengths;
but it has not pursued this ideal so madly
as to rush over the edge of the abyss, into
sheer libertarianism, into the chaos created
by the nineteenth-century theory of the
"outlaw conscience," conscientia exlex, the
conscience that knows no law higher than
its own subjective imperatives. Part of the
inner architecture of the American ideal
of freedom has been the profound conviction that only a virtuous people can be free.
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It is not an American belief that free government is inevitable, only that it is possible, and that its possibility can be realized
only when the people as a whole are
inwardly governed by the recognized imperatives of the universal moral law.
The American experiment reposes on
Acton's postulate, that freedom is the
highest phase of civil society. But it also
reposes on Acton's further postulate, that
the elevation of a people to this highest
phase of social life supposes, as its condition, that they understand the ethical nature
of political freedom. They must understand,
in Acton's phrase, that freedom is "not the
power of doing what we like, but the right
of being able to do what we ought." The
people claim this right, in all its articulated
forms, in the face of government; in the
name of this right, multiple limitations are
put upon the power of government. But the
claim can be made with the full resonance
of moral authority only to the extent that
it issues from an inner sense of responsibility to a higher law. In any phase civil
society demands order; in its highest phase
of freedom it demands that order should
not be imposed from the top down, as it
were, but should spontaneously flower outward from free obedience to the restraints
and imperatives that stem from inwardly
possessed moral principle. In this sense
democracy is more than a political experiment; it is a spiritual and moral enterprise.
And its success depends upon the virtue
of the people who undertake it. Men who
would be politically free must discipline
themselves. Likewise institutions which
would pretend to be free with a human
freedom must in their workings be governed from within and made to serve the
ends of virtue. Political freedom is endangered in its foundations as soon as the

universal moral values, upon whose shared
possession the self-discipline of a free
society depends, are no longer vigorous
enough to restrain the passions and shatter
the selfish inertia of men. The American
ideal of freedom as ordered freedom, and
therefore an ethical ideal, has traditionally
reckoned with these truths, these truisms.
7. "The American Bill of Rights differs
essentially from the Declaration of the
Rights of Man in the France of 1789."
In considerable part the latter was a
parchment-child of the Enlightenment, a
top-of-the-brain concoction of a set of men
who did not understand that a political
community, like man himself, has roots in
history and in nature. They believed that
a state could be simply a work of art, a
sort of absolute beginning, an artifact of
which abstract human reason could be the
sole artisan. Moreover, their exaggerated
individualism had shut them off from a
view of the organic nature of the human
community; their social atomism would
permit no institutions or associations intermediate between the individual and the
state.
In contrast, the men who framed the
American Bill of Rights understood history
and tradition, and they understood nature
in the light of both. They too were individualists, but not to the point of ignoring
the social nature of man. They did their
thinking within the tradition of freedom
that was their heritage from England. Its
roots were not in the top of anyone's brain
but in history. Importantly, its roots were
in the medieval notion of the homo liber et
legalis, the man whose freedom rests on
law, whose law was the age-old custom in
which the nature of man expressed itself,
and whose lawful freedoms were possessed
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in association with his fellows. The rights
for which the colonists contended against
the English Crown were basically the rights
of Englishmen. And these were substantially
the rights written into the Bill of Rights.
Of freedom of religion there will be
question later. For the rest, freedom of
speech, assembly, association, and petition
for the redress of grievances, security of
person, home, and property - these were
great historical as well as civil and natural
rights. So too was the right to trial by jury,
and all the procedural rights implied in the
Fifth- and later in the Fourteenth-Amendment provision for "due process of law."
The guarantee of these and other rights
was new in that it was written, in that it
envisioned these rights with an amplitude,
and gave them a priority, that had not been
known before in history. But the Bill of
Rights was an effective instrument for the
delimitation of governmental authority and
social power, not because it was written on
paper in 1789 or 1791, but because the
rights it proclaims had already been engraved by history on the conscience of a
people. The American Bill of Rights is not
a piece of eighteenth-century rationalist
theory; it is far more the product of
Christian history. Behind it one can see,
not the philosophy of the Enlightenment
but the older philosophy that had been the
matrix of the common law. The "man"
whose rights are guaranteed in the face of
law and government is, whether he knows
it or not, the Christian man, who had
learned to know his own personal dignity
in the school of Christian faith.
THE AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT

PLAN OF
TODAY

Does the philosophy of the Founding

Fathers still endure? Professor Rossiter
says it does:
Perhaps Americans could achieve a
larger measure of liberty and prosperity and
build a more successful government if they
were to abandon the language and assumptions of men who lived almost two centuries
ago. Yet the feeling cannot be downed that
rude rejection of the past, rather than levelheaded respect for it, would be the huge
mistake. Americans may eventually take the
advice of their advanced philosophers and
adopt a political theory that pays more attention to groups, classes, public opinion,
power-61ites, positive law, public administration, and other realities of twentieth-century
America. Yet it seems safe to predict that
the people, who occasionally prove themselves wiser than their philosophers, will go
on thinking about the political community
in terms of unalienable rights, popular
sovereignty, consent, constitutionalism, separation of powers, morality, and limited government. The political theory of the American Revolution-a theory of ethical, ordered
liberty - remains the political tradition of
the American people.*
A second and corroborative answer is
certainly valid of a not inconsiderable
portion of the American people, the Catholic community. The men of learning in it
acknowledge certain real contributions made
by positive sociological analysis of the
political community. But both they and
their less learned fellows still adhere, with
all the conviction of intelligence, to the
tradition of natural law as the basis of free
and ordered political life. Historically, this
tradition has found, and still finds, its intellectual home within the Catholic Church.
Catholic participation in the American
plan of government has been full and free,
unreserved and unembarrassed, because the
contents of this consensus - the ethical and
political principles drawn from the tradition
*Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic 449 (1953).
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of natural law - approve themselves to the
Catholic intelligence and conscience. Where
this kind of language is talked, the Catholic joins the conversation with complete
ease. It is his language. The ideas expressed
are native to his own universe of discourse.
Even the accent, being American, suits his
tongue.
II
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
AMERICAN

UNITY

In 1790 Edmund Burke published his
Reflections on the Revolution in France.
When he comes to his defense of English
institutions ("an established Church, an
established monarchy, an established aristocracy, and an established democracy"),
he says: "First I beg leave to speak of our
Church Establishment, which is the first of
our prejudices - not a prejudice destitute
of reason, but involving in it profound and
extensive wisdom. I speak of it first. It is
first, and last, and midst in our minds." In
that same year the people of the states newly
formed into the American Federal Republic
were debating the ten amendments to the
Constitution, submitted to them for ratification. The ratification was complete in
1791, and in that year the legal rule against
any establishment of religion was on its way
to becoming, where it had not already become, the first of our prejudices. There is
a contrast here, a clash of prejudices, which
still endures.
The subject might almost be left right
here, if it could be generally admitted that
the First Amendment expresses simply an
American prejudice, in Burke's sense of the
word. A prejudice is not necessarily an
error; to be prejudiced is not necessarily
to be unreasonable. Certain pre-judgments
are wholesome. Normally, they are concrete
judgments of value, not abstract judgments

of truth. The American Catholic is entirely
prepared to accept our constitutional concept of freedom of religion and the policy
of no establishment as the first of our
prejudices. He is also prepared to admit
that other prejudices may obtain elsewhere
- in England, in Sweden, in Spain. Their
validity in their own context and against
the background of the history that generated them does not disturb him in his conviction that his own prejudice, within his
own context and against the background
of his own history, has its own validity.
THEOLOGIES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

But, as it happens, one is not permitted
thus simply to end the matter. I leave aside
the practical issues that have arisen concerning the application of the First Amendment. The question here is one of theory,
the theory of the First Amendment in itself
and in its relation to Catholic theories of
freedom of religion and the Church-State
relation. It is customary to put to Catholics
what is supposed to be an embarrassing
question: Do you really believe in the first
two provisions of the First Amendment?
The question calls to mind one of the more
famous among the multitudinous queries
put by Boswell to Dr. Johnson. "whether
it is necessary to believe all the Thirty-Nine
Articles." And the Doctor's answer has an
applicable point: "Why, sir, that is a question which has been much agitated. Some
have held it necessary that they should all
be believed. Others have considered them
to be only articles of peace, that is to say,
you are not to preach against them."
An analogous difference of interpretation
seems to exist with regard to the first two
articles of the First Amendment.
On the one hand there are those who
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read into them certain ultimate tenets,
certain specifically sectarian tenets with
regard to the nature of religion, religious
truth, the church, faith, conscience, divine
revelation, human freedom, etc. In this
view these articles are invested with a
genuine sanctity, that derives from their
religious content. They are dogmas, norms
of orthodoxy, to which one must conform
on pain of some manner of excommunication. They are true articles of faith. Hence
it is necessary to believe them, to give them
a religiously motivated assent.
On the other hand there are those who
see in these articles only a law, not a
dogma. These constitutional clauses have
no religious content; they answer none of
the eternal human questions with regard to
the nature of truth and freedom or the
manner in which the spiritual order of
man's life is to be organized or not organized. Therefore they are not invested with
the sanctity that attaches to dogma, but
only with the rationality that attaches to
law. In a word they are not articles of
faith but articles of peace, that is to say,
you may not act against them, because they
are law and good law.
Those who dogmatize about these articles
do not usually do so with all the clarity
that dogmas require. Nor are they in agreement with one another. The main difference is between those who see in these
articles certain Protestant religious tenets
and those who see in them certain ultimate
suppositions of secular liberalism.
The differences between those two groups
tend to disappear in a third group, the
secularizing Protestants, so called, who
effect an identification of their Protestantism
with American secular culture, consider the
church to be true. in proportion as its or-
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ganization is commanded by the norms of
secular democratic society, and bring about
a coincidence of religious and secularliberal concepts of freedom.
This is not the place to argue the question, whether and how far any of these
views can be sustained as an historical
thesis. What matters here is a different
question, whether any of them can serve
as a rule of interpretation of the First
Amendment.
The questions all reduce themselves to
two: Is the no-establishment clause a piece
of ecclesiology, and is the free-exercise
clause a piece of religious philosophy? The
general Protestant tendency, visible at its
extreme in the free-church tradition, especially among the Baptists, is to answer
affirmatively to these questions. Freedom
of religion and separation of church and
state are to be, in the customary phrase,
"rooted in religion itself." Their substance
is to be conceived in terms of sectarian
Protestant doctrine. They are therefore
articles of faith; not to give them a religious
assent is to fall into heterodoxy.
The secularist dissents from the Protestant theological and philosophical exegesis
of the first of our prejudices. But it is to
him likewise an article of faith (he might
prefer to discard the word, "faith," and
speak rather of ultimate presuppositions).
Within this group also there are differences
of opinion. Perhaps the most sharpened
view is taken by those who in their pursuit
of truth reject not only the traditional
methods of Christian illumination, both
Protestant and Catholic, but also the reflective methods of metaphysical inquiry.
These men commit themselves singly to the
method of scientific empiricism. There is
therefore no eternal order of truth and
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justice; there are no universal verities that
require man's assent, no universal moral
law that commands his obedience. Such an
order of universals is not empirically demonstrable. Truth therefore is to be understood in a positivistic sense; its criteria are
either those of science or those of practical
life, i.e., the success of an opinion in getting itself accepted in the market place.
With this view of truth there goes a corresponding view of freedom. The essence of
freedom is "noncommittalism." The mind
or will that is committed, absolutely and
finally, is by definition not free. It has
fallen from grace by violating its own nature. In the intellectual enterprise the
search for truth, not truth itself or its possession, is the highest value. In the order
of morals the norm for man is never
reached by knowledge; it is only approximated by inspired guesses or by tentative
practical rules that are the precipitate of
experience, substantiated only by their
utility.
This school of thought, which is of relatively recent growth in America, thrusts
into the First Amendment its own ultimate
views of truth, freedom and religion. Religion itself is not a value, except insofar as
its ambiguous reassurances may have the
emotional effect of reassuring. Roman
Catholicism is a disvalue. Nevertheless, religious freedom, as a form of freedom, is a
value. It has at least the negative value of
an added emancipation, another sheer release. It may also have the positive value
of another blow struck at the principle of
authority in any of its forms; for in this
school authority is regarded as absolutely
antinomous to freedom.
Furthermore, this school usually reads
into the First Amendment a more or less

articulated political theory. Civil society is
the highest societal form of human life;
even the values that are called spiritual and
moral are values by reason of their reference to society. Civil law is the highest
form of law and it is not subject to judgment by prior ethical canons. Civil rights
are the highest form of rights; for the dignity of the person, which grounds these
rights, is only his civility; civility is humanity's highest perfection. The state is purely
the instrumentality of the popular will,
than which there is no higher sovereignty.
Government is to the citizen what the cabdriver is to the passenger (to use Yves
Simon's descriptive metaphor). And since
the rule of the majority is the method
whereby the popular will expresses itself, it
is the highest governing principle of statecraft, from which there is no appeal. Finally, the ultimate value within society and
state does not consist in any substantive
ends that these societal forms may pursue;
rather it consists in the process of their
pursuit. That is to say, the ultimate value
resides in the forms of the democratic
process itself, because these forms embody
the most ultimate of all values, freedom.
Given this political theory, the churches
are inevitably englobed within the state, as
private associations organized for particular purposes which possess their title to
existence from positive law. Their right to
freedom is a civil right, and it is respected
as long as it is not understood to include
any claim to independently sovereign authority. Such a claim must be disallowed
on grounds of the final and indivisible sovereignty of the democratic process over all
the associational aspects of human life.
The notion that any church should acquire
status in public life as a society in its own
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right is per se absurd; for there is only one
society, civil society, which may so exist.
In this view, separation of church and state,
as ultimately implying a subordination of
church to state, follows from the very nature of the state and its law; just as religious
freedom follows from the very nature of
freedom and of truth.
The foregoing is a sort of anatomical
description of two interpretations of the
religion clauses of the First Amendment.
The description is made anatomical in
order to point the issue. If these clauses are
made articles of faith in either of the described senses, there are immediately in this
country some 30,000,000 dissenters, the
Catholic community. Not being either a
Protestant or a secularist, the Catholic rejects the religious position of Protestants
with regard to the nature of the church, the
meaning of faith, the absolute primacy of
conscience, etc.; just as he rejects secularist views with regard to the nature of
truth, freedom, and civil society as man's
last end. He rejects these positions as
demonstrably erroneous in themselves.
What is more to the point here, he rejects
the notion that any of these sectarian theses
enter into the content or implications of the
First Amendment in such wise as to demand the assent of all American citizens.
If this were the case the very article that
bars any establishment of religion would
somehow establish one. (Given the controversy between Protestant and secularist,
there would be the added difficulty that one
could not know just what religion had been
established.) If it be true that the First
Amendment is to be given a theological
interpretation and that therefore it must be
"believed," made an object of religious
faith, it would follow that a religious test
has been thrust into the Constitution. The
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Federal Republic has suddenly become a
voluntary fellowship of believers either in
some sort of free-church Protestantism or
in the tenets of a naturalistic humanism.
The notion is preposterous. The United
States is an awfully good place to live in;
many have found it even a sort of secular
sanctuary. But it is not a church, whether
high, low, or broad. It is simply a civil
community, whose unity is purely political,
consisting in "agreement on the good of
man at the level of performance without
the necessity of agreement on ultimates"
(to adopt a phrase from the 1945 Harvard
Report on General Education in a Free
Society). As regards important points of
ultimate religious belief, the United States
is pluralist. Any attempt at reducing this
pluralism by law, through a process of reading certain sectarian tenets into the fundamental law of the land, is prima facie
illegitimate and absurd.
Theologians of the First Amendment,
whether Protestant or secularist, are accustomed to appeal to history. They stress
the importance of ideological factors in the
genesis of the American concept of freedom of religion and separation of church
and state. However, these essays in theological history are never convincing. In the
end it is always Roger Williams to whom
appeal is made. Admittedly, he was the
only man in pre-Federal America who had
a consciously articulated theory. The difficulty is that the Williams who is appealed
to is a Williams who never was. Prof. Perry
Miller's recent book, Roger Williams, is
useful in this respect. Its citations and
analyses verify the author's statement: "I
have long been persuaded that accounts
written in the last century create a figure
admirable by the canons of modern secular
liberalism, but only distantly related to the
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actual Williams." He was a seventeenthcentury Calvinist who somehow had got
hold of certain remarkably un-Calvinist
ideas on the nature of the political order
in its distinction from the church. He then
exaggerated this distinction in consequence
of his special concept of the discontinuity
of the Old and New Testaments and of
the utter transcendence of the church in
the New Testament, which forbids it to
maintain any contacts with the temporal
order. In any event, Williams' premises and
purposes were not those of the secular liberal democrat, any more than his rigidly
orthodox Calvinist theology is that of his
Baptist progeny.
However, this is not the place to explore
Williams' ideas, ecclesiastical or political.
The point is that his ideas, whatever their
worth, had no genetic influence on the First
Amendment. Professor Miller makes the
point: "Hence, although Williams is celebrated as the prophet of religious freedom,
he actually exerted little or no influence on
institutional developments in America;
only after the conception of liberty for all
denominations had triumphed on wholly
other grounds did Americans look back on
Williams and invest him with his ill-fitting
halo." Williams therefore is to be ruled out
as the original theologian of the First
Amendment. In fact, one must rule out the
whole idea that any theologians stood at
the origin of this piece of legislation. The
truth of history happens to be more prosaic than the fancies of the secular liberals.
In seeking an understanding of the first of
our prejudices we have to abandon the
poetry of those who would make a religion
out of freedom of religion and a dogma out
of separation of church and state. We have
to talk prose, the prose of the Constitution

itself, which is an ordinary legal prose having little to do with doctrinaire theories.
ARTICLES OF PEACE

From the standpoint both of history and
of contemporary social reality the only tenable position is that the first two articles
of the First Amendment are not articles of
faith but articles of peace. Like the rest of
the Constitution these provisions are the
work of lawyers, not of theologians or even
of political theorists. They are not true
dogma but only good law; that is praise
enough. This, I take it, is the Catholic view.
But in thus qualifying it I am not marking
it out as just another "sectarian" view. It
is in fact the only view that a citizen with
both historical sense and common sense
can take.
That curiously clairvoyant statesman,
John C. Calhoun, once observed that "this
admirable federal constitution of ours is
superior to the wisdom of any or all of the
men by whose agency it was made. The
force of circumstances and not foresight or
wisdom induced them to adopt many of its
wisest provisions." The observation is particularly pertinent to the religion clauses of
the First Amendment. If history makes one
thing clear it is that these clauses were the
twin children of social necessity, the necessity of creating a social environment, protected by law, in which men of differing
religious faiths might live together in peace.
It did indeed take some little time before
the special American solution to the problem of religious pluralism worked itself out;
but it is almost inconceivable that it should
not have worked itself out as it did. One
suspects that this would have been true
even if there had been no Williamses and
Penns, no Calverts and Madisons and Jeffersons. The theories of these men, what-
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ever their merits, would probably have
made only literature not history, had it not
been for the special social context into
which they were projected.
To say this is not of course to embrace
a theory of historical or social determinism.
It is only to say that the artisans of the
American Republic and its Constitution
were not radical theorists intent on constructing a society in accord with the a
priori demands of a doctrinaire blueprint,
under disregard for what was actually
"given" in history. Fortunately they were,
as I said, for the most part lawyers. And
they had a strong sense of that primary
criterion of good law which is its necessity
or utility for the preservation of the public
peace, under a given set of conditions. All
law looks to the common good, which is
normative for all law. And social peace,
assured by equal justice in dealing with
possibly conflicting groups, is the highest
integrating element of the common good.
This legal criterion is the first and most
solid ground on which the validity of the
First Amendment rests.
Religious liberty and separation of
church and state in America came into being under the pressure of their necessity
for the public peace. Four leading factors,
contributed to this social necessity. First,
there was the great mass of the unchurched.
They were either people cut off from religion by the conditions of frontier life; or
people careless of religion in consequence
of preoccupation with the material concerns
of this world; or people concerned with
religion as indispensable to morality and
therefore to ordered civil life, but unconcerned with, or even hostile toward, what
is called organized religion. The fact may
be embarrassing to the high-minded believer, but it is nevertheless a fact that the

development of religious freedom in society
bears a distinct relationship to the growth
of unbelief and indifference. Our historical
good fortune lay in the particular kind of
unbelief that American society has known.
It was not Continental laicism, superficially
anticlerical, fundamentally antireligious,
militant in its spirit, active in its purpose
to destroy what it regarded as hateful. Unbelief in America has been rather easygoing, the product more of a naive materialism than of any conscious conviction.
The second factor was the multiplicity
of denominations. This was Protestantism's
decisive contribution to the cause of religious freedom - decisive because made at
a time when the rapidly proliferating denominations were less disposed than they
now are to live together in peace. The sheer
fact of dissent and sectarian antagonisms
was a particularly important motive of the
Federal constitutional arrangements; for at
that time four states still retained establishments of various kinds. One recalls John
Adams' testy reluctance to hear any argument about disestablishment in Massachusetts.
Thirdly, the economic factor was by no
means unimportant. It was present in the
somewhat impenetrable thinking of the
two Calverts. The merchants of New Jersey,
New York, Virginia and the more southern
colonies were as emphatically on the side
of religious freedom as on the side of commercial profits. Persecution and discrimination were as bad for business affairs as they
were for the affairs of the soul.
A fourth factor of lesser importance was
the pressure, not indeed very great but real
enough, exerted by the widening of religious freedom in England. This growth
had been fostered by the same factors that

JULY, 1955

were operating more strongly in America.
Anglicanism and Nonconformism were engaged in a struggle whose issue was already
becoming clear. It was not to be disestablishment; Burke's prejudice, widely shared,
would be too strong to permit that. But it
would at least be religious freedom (except
for Catholics), conjoined with establishment.
These four factors, taken as sociological
complex, made it sufficiently clear to all
reasonable men that under American conditions any other course but freedom of
religion and separation of church and state
would have been disruptive, imprudent,
impractical, indeed impossible. Such a case
does not appeal to mean-spirited expediency nor does it imply a reluctant concession to force majeure. In the science of law
and the art of jurisprudence the appeal to
social peace is an appeal to a high moral
value. Behind the will to social peace there
stands a divine and Christian imperative.
This is the classic and Christian tradition.
Roger Williams was no partisan of the
view that all religions ought to be equally
free because, for all anybody knows, they
may all be equally true, or false. He reckons
with truth and falsity in honest fashion.
Yet even in the case of a "false religion
(unto which the civil magistrate dare not
adjoin)" he recommends as the first duty
of the civil magistrate "permission (for approbation he owes not what is evil) and
this according to Matthew 13:30, for public peace and quiet's sake." The reference
is the parable of the tares.
It is interesting that this same parable
is referred to by Pius XII in his discourse
to a group of Italian jurists on December
6, 1953. This discourse is the latest affirmation of the primacy of the principle of peace

(or "union," which is the Pope's synonymous word) when it comes to dealing with
the "difficulties and tendencies" which arise
out of mankind's multiple pluralisms and
dissensions. The "fundamental theoretical
principle," says the Pope (and one should
underscore the word "theoretical"; it is not
a question of sheer pragmatism, much less
of expediency in the low sense), is this:
"within the limits of the possible and the
lawful, to promote everything that facilitates union and makes it more effective; to
remove everything that disturbs it; to tolerate at times that which it is impossible
to correct but which on the other hand
must not be permitted to make shipwreck
of the community from which a higher
good is looked for." This higher good, in
the context of the whole discourse, is "the
establishment of peace."
From this firm footing of traditional
principle the Pope proceeds to reject the
view of certain Catholic theorists who in a
sort of cut-and-thrust manner would wish
to "solve" the problem of religious pluralism on the ultimate basis of this doctrinaire
argument: Religious and moral error have
no rights and therefore must always be repressed when repression of them is possible. In contradiction of this view the Pope
says, after quoting the parable of the tares:
"The duty of repressing religious and moral
error cannot therefore be an ultimate norm
of action. It must be subordinated to higher
and more general norms which in some
circumstances permit, and even perhaps
make it appear the better course of action,
that error should not be impeded in order
to promote a greater good." The Pope
makes a clear distinction between the abstract order of ethics or theology, where
it is a question of qualifying doctrines or
practices as true or false, right or wrong,
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and the concrete order of jurisprudence,
where it is a question of using or not using
the coercive instrument of law in favor of
the true and good, against the false and
wrong. In this latter order the highest and
most general norm is the public peace, the
common good in its various aspects. This is
altogether a moral norm.
In fact, the Pope flatly states that "in
certain circumstances God does not give
men any mandate, does not impose any
duty, and does not even communicate the
right to impede or to repress what is erroneous and false."t The First Amendment
is simply the legal enunciation of this papal
statement. It does not say that there is no
distinction between true and false religion,
good and bad morality. But it does say that
in American circumstances the conscience
of the community, aware of its moral obligations to the peace of the community, and
speaking therefore as the voice of God,
does not give government any mandate,
does not impose upon it any duty, and
does not even communicate to it the right
to repress religious opinions or practices,
even though they are erroneous and false.
On these grounds it is easy to see why
the Catholic conscience has always consented to the religion clauses of the Constitution. They conform to the highest
criterion for all legal rulings in this delicate
matter. The criterion is moral; therefore,
the law that meets it is good, because it is
for the common good. Therefore the consent given to the law is given on grounds
of moral principle. To speak of expediency
here is altogether to misunderstand the
tinternational Community and Religious Toler-

ance, Address by Pope Pius XII to the Fifth

National Convention of the Union of Italian Catholic Jurists, I The Pope Speaks 68 (lst Quarter
1954).
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moral nature of the community and its collective moral obligation toward its own
common good. The origins of our fundamental law are in moral principle; the obliga tions it imposes are moral obligations,
binding in conscience. One may not, without
moral fault, act against these articles of
peace.
THE DISTINCTION

OF CHURCH

AND STATE

Another powerful historical force must
be considered, namely, the dominant impulse toward self-government, government
by the people in the most earnest sense
of the word. Above all else the early Americans wanted political freedom. And the
force of this impulse necessarily acted as a
corrosive upon the illegitimate "unions" of
church and state which the post-Reformation era had brought forth. The establishments of the time were, by and large, either
theocratic, wherein the state was absorbed
in the church, or Erastian, wherein the
church was absorbed in the state. In both
cases the result was some limitation upon
freedom, either in the form of civil disabilities imposed in the name of the established religion, or in the form of religious
disabilities imposed in the name of the
civil law of the covenanted community.
Men might share the fear of Roger Williams, that the state would corrupt the
church, or the fear of Thomas Jefferson,
that the church would corrupt the state. In
either case their thought converged to the
one important conclusion: an end had to
be put to the current confusions of the religious and political orders; the ancient distinction between church and state had to be
newly reaffirmed in a manner adapted to the
American scene.
The distinction lay readily within the
reach of the early American lawyers and
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statesmen; for it was part of the English
legal heritage, part of the patrimony of the
common law. One can see it appearing, for
instance, in Madison's famous Memorial
and Remonstrance, where it is interpreted
in a manner conformable to the anti-ecclesiasticism which he had in common with
Jefferson. But the interesting figure here is
again Roger Williams. Reading him, the
Catholic theorist is inclined to agree with
those "juditious persons" whose verdict
was reluctantly and belatedly recorded by
Cotton Mather. They "judged him," said
Mather, "to have the root of the matter in
him." In the present question the root of
the matter is this distinction of the spiritual
and temporal orders and their respective
jurisdictions. One is tempted to think that
he got hold of this root at least partly
because of his early acquaintance with
English law; he was for a time secretary
to the great Sir Edward Coke and it is at
least not unlikely that he continued his
legal interests at Cambridge. In any event,
this distinction was a key principle with
Williams; he had his own special understanding of it, but at least he understood it.
Roger Williams was not a Father of the
Federal Constitution; he is adduced here
only as a witness, in his own way, to the
genuine Western tradition of politics. The
point is that the distinction of church and
state, one of the central assertions of this
tradition, found its way into the Constitution. There it received a special embodiment, adapted to the peculiar genius of
American government and to the concrete
conditions of American society.
The area of state - that is, legal - con-

cern was limited to the pursuit of certain
enumerated secular purposes (to say that
the purposes are secular is not to deny that
many of them are also moral; so for in-

stance the establishment of justice and
peace, the promotion of the general welfare, etc.). Thus made autonomous in its
own sphere, government was denied all
competence in the field of religion. In this
field freedom was to be the rule and
method; government was powerless to legislate respecting an establishment of religion and likewise powerless to prohibit the
free exercise of religion. Its single office
was to take the legal or judicial steps necessary on given occasions to make effective
the guarantee of freedom.
We have not yet found an answer to the
question whether government can make
effective the primary intention of the First
Amendment, the guarantee of freedom of
religion, simply by attempting to make
more and more "impregnable" what is
called, in Rogers Williams' fateful metaphor, the "wall of separation" between
church and state. However, what concerns
us here is the root of the matter, the fact
that the American Constitution embodies
in a special way the traditional principle
of the distinction between church and state.
For Catholics this fact is of great and providential importance for one major reason:
it serves sharply to set off our constitutional system from the system against which
the Church waged its long-drawn-out fight
in the nineteenth century, namely, Jacobinism, or (in Carlton Hayes's term) sectarian Liberalism, or (in the more definitive
term used today) totalitarian democracy.
It is now coming to be recognized that
the Church opposed the "separation of
church and state" of the sectarian Liberals
because in theory and in fact it did not
mean separation at all but perhaps the most
drastic unification of church and state
which history had known. The Jacobin
"free state" was as regalist as the ancien
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regime, and even more so. Writing as a
historian, de Tocqueville long ago made
this plain. And the detailed descriptions
which Leo XIII, writing as a theologian
and political moralist, gave of the Church's
"enemy" make the fact even more plain.
Within this "free state" the so-called "free
church" was subject to a political control
more complete than the Tudor or Stuart or
Bourbon monarchies dreamed of. The evidence stretches all the way from the Civil
Constitution of the Clergy in 1790 to the
Law of Separation in 1905. In the system
sponsored by the sectarian Liberals, as has
been well said, "The state pretends to
ignore the Church; in reality it never took
more cognizance of her." In the law of
1905, the climactic development, the
Church was arrogantly assigned a juridical
statute articulated in forty-four articles,
whereby almost every aspect of her organization and action was minutely regulated.
Moreover, this was done on principle the principle of the primacy of the political,
the principle of "everything within the
state, nothing above the state." This was
the cardinal thesis of sectarian Liberalism,
whose full historical development is now
being witnessed in the totalitarian "people's democracies" behind the Iron Curtain.
As the Syllabus and its explicatory documents - as well as the multitudinous writings of Leo XIII - make entirely clear, it
was this thesis of the juridical omnipotence
and omnicompetence of the state which
was the central object of the Church's condemnation of the Jacobin development. It
was because freedom of religion and separation of church and state were predicated
on this thesis that the Church refused to
accept them in thesi, as the phrase has it.
This thesis was utterly rejected by the
founders of the American Republic. The

rejection was as warranted as it was providential, because this thesis is not only theologically heterodox, as denying the reality
of the Church; it is also politically revolutionary, as denying the substance of the
liberal tradition. The American thesis is that
government is not juridically omnipotent;
its powers are limited, and one of the principles of limitation is the distinction between state and church, in their purposes,
methods, and manner of organization. The
Jacobin thesis was basically philosophical;
it derived from a sectarian concept of the
autonomy of reason. It was also theological,
as implying a sectarian concept of religion
and of any way to supervise her exercise
of authority in pursuit of her own distinct
ends.
The juridical result of the American limitation of governmental powers is the guarantee fo the Church of a stable condition
of freedom as a matter of law and right. It
should be added that this guarantee is made
not only to the individual Catholic but to
the Church as an organized society with its
own law and jurisdiction.
Perhaps the root of the matter, as hitherto described, might be seen summed up in
an incident of early American and Church
history. This is Leo Pfeffer's account of it:
In 1783 the papal nuncio at Paris addressed a note to Benjamin Franklin suggesting that, since it was no longer possible
to maintain the previous status whereunder
American Catholics were subject to the
Vicar Apostolic at London, the Holy See
proposed to Congress that a Catholic bishopric be established in one of the American
cities. Franklin transmitted the note to the
[Continental] Congress, which directed
Franklin to notify the nuncio that "the subject of his application to Doctor Franklin
being purely spiritual, it is without the jurisdiction and powers of Congress, who have
no authority to permit or refuse it, these
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powers being reserved to the several states
individually." (Not many years later the
several states would likewise declare them-

selves to "have no authority to permit or
refuse" such a purely spiritual exercise of

ecclesiastical jurisdiction.)
The good Nuncio must have been
mightily surprised on receiving this communication. Not for centuries had the Holy
See been free to erect a bishopric and appoint a bishop without the prior consent of
government, without prior exercise of the
governmental right of presentation, without all the legal formalities with which the
so-called Catholic states had fettered the
freedom of the Church. In the United States
the freedom of the Church was completely
unfettered; she could organize herself with
the full independence which is her native
right. This, it may be confidentially said,
was a turning point in the long and complicated history of Church-State relations.
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

One final ground for affirming the validity of the religion clauses of the First
Amendment as good law must be briefly
touched on. Holmes's famous dictum, "The
life of the law is not logic but experience,"
has more truth in it than many other
Holmesian dicta. When a law ceases to be
supported by a continued experience of its
goodness, it becomes a dead letter, an
empty legal form. Although pure pragmatism cannot be made the philosophy of law,
nonetheless the value of any given law is
importantly pragmatic. The First Amendment surely passes this test of good law. In
support of it one can adduce an American
experience. One might well call it the
American experience in the sense that it has
been central in American history and also
unique in the history of the world.
This experience has three facets, all in-

terrelated. First, America has proved by
experience that political unity and stability
are possible without uniformity of religious
belief and practice, without the necessity of
any governmental restrictions on any religion.
The second American experience was
that stable political unity, which means
perduring agreement on the common good
of man at the level of performance, is positively strengthened by the exclusion of religious differences from the area of concern
allotted to government. In America we have
been rescued from the disaster of ideological parties. They are a disaster because,
where such parties exist, power becomes a
special kind of prize: the struggle for power
is a partisan struggle for the means whereby the opposing ideology may be destroyed.
It has been remarked that only in a disintegrating society does politics become a
controversy over ends; it should be simply
a controversy over means to ends already
agreed on with sufficient unanimity.
The third and most striking aspect of the
American experience consists in the fact
that religion itself, and not least the Catholic Church, has benefited by our free
institutions, by the maintenance, even in
exaggerated form, of the distinction between Church and state. Within the same
span of history the experience of the
Church elsewhere, especially in the Latin
lands, has been alternatively an experience
of privilege or persecution. The reason lay
in a particular concept of government. It
was alternatively the determination of government to ally itself either with the purposes of the Church or with the purposes
of some sect or other (sectarian Liberalism,
for instance) which made a similar, however erroneous, claim to possess the full
and final truth. It would be difficult to say
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which experience, privilege or persecution,
proved in the end to be the more damaging
or gainful to the Church.
In contrast, American government has
not undertaken to represent transcendental
truth in any of the versions of it current in
American society. It does indeed represent
the commonly shared moral values of the
community. It also represents the supreme
religious truth expressed in the motto on
American coins: "In God we trust." For
the rest, government represents the truth
of society as it actually is; and the truth is
that American society is religiously pluralist. The truth is lamentable; it is nonetheless true. Many of the beliefs entertained
within society ought not to be believed, because they are false; nonetheless men
believe them. It is not the function of government to resolve the dispute between
conflicting truths, all of which claim the
final validity of transcendence. As representative of a pluralist society, wherein religious faith is - as it must be - free,
government undertakes to represent the
principle of freedom.
In taking this course American government would seem to be on the course set
by Pius XII for the religiously pluralist
international community, of which America
offers, as it were, a pattern in miniature. In
the discourse already cited he distinguishes
two questions: "The first concerns the objective truth and the obligation of conscience toward that which is objectively
true and good." This question, he goes on,
"can hardly be made the object of discussion and ruling among the individual states
and their communities, especially in the
case of a plurality of religious confessions
within the same community." In other
words, government is not a judge of religious truth; parliaments are not to play
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the theologian. In accord with this principle American government does not presume to discuss, much less rule upon, the
objective truth or falsity of the various
religious confessions within society. It puts
to itself only Pius XII's second question,
which concerns "the practical attitude" of
government in the face of religious pluralism. It answers this question by asserting
that in the given circumstances it has
neither the mandate nor the duty nor the
right to legislate either in favor of or against
any of the religious confessions existent in
American society, which in its totality government must represent. It will therefore
only represent their freedom, in the face of
civil law, to exist, since they do in fact exist.
This is precisely the practical attitude which
Pius XII recognizes as right, as the proper
moral and political course.
CONCLUSION

In the final analysis any validation of
the First Amendment as good law - no
matter by whom undertaken, be he Protestant, Catholic, Jew, or secularist - must
make appeal to the three arguments developed above: the demands of social necessity, the rightfulness within our own
circumstances of the American manner of
asserting the distinction between church
and state, and the lessons of experience.
Perhaps the last argument is the most
powerful. It is also, I may add, the argument which best harmonizes with the
general tone which arguments for our institutions are accustomed to adopt. In a
curiously controlling way this tone was set
by the Federalistpapers. These essays were
not political treatises after the manner of
Hobbes and Hegel, Rousseau and Comte,
or even John Locke. It has been remarked
that in America no treatises of this kind
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have been produced; and it is probably
just as well. The authors of the Federalist
papers were not engaged in broaching a
political theory universal in scope and
application, a plan for an Ideal Republic
of Truth and Virtue. They were arguing
for a particular Constitution, a special kind
of governmental structure, a limited ensemble of concrete laws, all designed for
application within a given society. They
were in the tradition of the Revolutionary
thinkers who led a colonial rebellion, not
in the name of a set of flamboyant abstractions, but in the name of the sober laws
of the British Constitution which they felt
were being violated in their regard. It has
been pointed out that the only real slogan
the Revolution produced was: "No taxation without representation." It has not the
ring of a trumpet; its sound is more like
the dry rustle of a lawyer's sheaf of parchment.
It is in the tone of this tradition of
American political writing that one should
argue for the First Amendment. The arguments will tend to be convincing in proportion as their key of utterance approaches
a dry rustle and not a wild ring. The arguments here presented are surely dry enough.
Perhaps they will not satisfy the doctrinaire, the theologizer. But they do, I think,
show that the first of our prejudices is "not
a prejudice destitute of reason, but involving in it profound and extensive wisdom."
This is all that need be shown; it is likewise
all that can be shown.
The Catholic Church in America is committed to this prejudice by the totality of
her experience in American history. As far
as I know, the only ones who doubt the

firmness, the depth, the principled nature
of this commitment are not Catholics. They
speak without knowledge and without authority; and the credence they command
has its origins in emotion. If perhaps what
troubles them is the fact that the commitment is limited, in the sense that it is not
to the truth and sanctity of a dogma but
only to the rationality and goodness of a
law, they might recall the story of Pompey.
After the capture of Jerusalem in 63 B.c.
he went to the Temple and forced his way
into the Holy of Holies. To his intense
astonishment he found it empty. He should
not have been astonished; for the emptiness
was the symbol of the absence of idolatry.
It symbolized the essential truth of Judaism, that One is the Lord. Professor Boorstin, who recounts the tale, adds: "Perhaps
the same surprise awaits the student of
American culture [or, I add, the American
Constitution] if he finally manages to penetrate the arcanum of our belief. And for a
similar reason. Far from being disappointed, we should be inspired that in an
era of idolatry, when so many nations have
filled their sanctuaries with ideological
idols, we have had the courage to refuse
to do so."
The American Catholic is on good
ground when he refuses to make an ideological idol out of religious freedom and
separation of church and state, when he
refuses to "believe" in them as articles of
faith. He takes the highest ground available
in this matter of the relations between religion and government when he asserts that
his commitment to the religion clauses of
the Constitution is a moral commitment to
them as articles of peace in a pluralist
society.

